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Abstract
 Th is qualitative research investigates the degree in which pupils, who belong to diﬀerent reli-
gions, express their religious otherness in dialogical communication, the degree in which teachers 
oﬀer them room to do so and the views on religious pluralism that teachers use to this end. 
Otherness refers to the relation of the I with himself and with the other. Th e expressions of oth-
erness of both teachers and pupils in nine lessons on interreligious communication were analysed 
by means of the Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes, an instrument to describe interactions 
between people as conveyed in language. In addition interviews were used to investigate which 
views on religious pluralism the teachers use in interreligious communication. Th e main conclu-
sion of the research is that both teachers and pupils do express otherness in interreligious com-
munication, be it to a limited extent. Th e teachers and pupils that participated in the research 
appeared to feel a certain shyness to express otherness. Th is shyness can perhaps be explained by 
the educational context in which the interreligious communication took place. It is characterized 
by forces that wish to impose limitations to otherness in order to guarantee a maximum of com-
prehension and by the concept of religion that teachers use, which focuses on expressing simi-
larities between religions rather than on expressing religious otherness. 
 Keywords 
 interreligious communication, interreligious dialogue, otherness, religious pluralism, interac-
tion, utterance.
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 1. Introduction 
 In this article we report on a research into interreligious communication in 
catholic primary schools in the Netherlands. Interreligious learning takes place 
by means of this communication. Th e purpose of interreligious learning can be 
described as bringing about a dialogue between pupils that belong to diﬀerent 
religions. At the centre of this dialogue is that pupils express the meanings of 
religions, i.e. their religious otherness. Otherness is a relational term which 
refers to the identity (or distinctiveness) of a person or collective. What I asso-
ciate with ‘myself ’ is my otherness from the perspective of the other and what 
the other associates with himself is the otherness of the other from my perspec-
tive. We use the term otherness in order to stress the uniqueness of a personal 
or collective identity, or, to put it diﬀerently, to prevent reduction of identity 
to sameness. Th e other is a self who can (in freedom) decide what to do, think, 
feel, long for, et cetera. Without the self, the identity of persons or social groups 
is reduced to objects (Ricoeur, 1992). In interreligious communication the 
religious otherness of pupils can be expressed at two levels: at the level of the 
public stature of religion and at the level of the personal appropriation of reli-
gion. Th e public representation of religions refers to an institutional manifesta-
tion of religion, with the correct interpretation of a religious tradition being 
based on the power of religious authorities. Personal appropriation is the mean-
ing which individual people attribute to elements of a religion. Th is research 
focuses on the expression of this personal meaning of religion. 
 Little research has been conducted into the expression of otherness in inter-
religious classroom communication. Th e expression of otherness in interreli-
gious communication aﬀects interreligious learning. After all, it is a matter of 
(at least the possibility of ) learning if one becomes acquainted with something 
new, which means something unfamiliar. In this article we zoom in at the level 
of the personal appropriation of religion, because it is in this instance where 
the strangeness of the otherness of the religious other is strongest. After all, 
one may have become acquainted with the public manifestation of a religion 
at an earlier stage, for instance through the media. Th e otherness as the per-
sonal meaning of religion is generally unknown, unless one has already met 
the other before. 
 Do teachers stimulate pupils to express their religious otherness at the level 
of the personal appropriation? If so, which teachers do? Th e expression of the 
otherness of pupils from diﬀerent religions assumes a concept of religion with 
room for otherness and where the otherness also contributes to the develop-
ment of the personal identity of pupils. Teachers who do not oﬀer room to 
otherness and who do not stimulate the expression of otherness, do not get a 
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learning process going, either. Research shows that teachers usually do not ask 
pupils to express their own otherness (Lockhorst, Van Oers & Wubbels, 2006). 
Teachers like to control the learning process, both as far as the contents of the 
learning process is concerned and the way in which it takes shape. Th e other-
ness of the religious other makes teachers feel insecure. Many teachers reduce 
this insecurity by projecting their wish for security on the pupils. 
 To obtain more insight into the expression of the otherness of pupils from 
diﬀerent religions at the level of the personal appropriation in interreligious 
classroom communication, we have studied the degree in which pupils express 
their own religious otherness as an utterance of the perspective of themselves. 
And what do teachers do in the communication preceding and following the 
pupils’ expression of otherness? Do they help pupils exploring their otherness 
or do they ignore expressions of otherness? Th ese questions were studied 
empirically during nine lessons in interreligious learning of pupils who were 
10-12 years old. We videotaped the nine lessons in interreligious communica-
tion. We wrote out all communication during these nine lessons, after which 
we analyzed the transcripts of the lessons. 
 We also investigated the views of teachers on religious pluralism and the 
relation between religions. Many teachers have a certain ignorance of religion. 
Research shows that teachers who are unfamiliar with religion, experience 
more diﬃculty with discussing the personal appropriation of religions than 
the public meanings of these religions (Hermans, 2003b). In the latter case 
a teacher can always fall back on the institutionally deﬁned meanings of a 
religious tradition. To investigate teachers’ views on religious pluralism and 
on the relation between religions we interviewed the teachers who taught the 
lessons. Due to the explorative character of our research, we have restricted 
ourselves to an empirical description of the expression of otherness and of the 
views that teachers have regarding religious pluralism and the relation between 
religions. We did not investigate whether or not or how there is a connection 
between the room teachers allow for otherness in their views and in the 
communication. 
 What is the structure of this article? In paragraph two we further examine 
the otherness of a person. Paragraph three focuses on the meaning of otherness 
in dialogical communication. In paragraph four we explain the signiﬁcance of 
otherness in interreligious dialogical communication. Paragraph ﬁve contains 
the report of the empirical part of the research. In paragraph six we present the 
results of our analyses. We end this article in paragraph seven with the formu-
lation of some conclusions and subjects for debate. 
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 2. Otherness and the Dialogical Self 
 In this paragraph we explain what we mean by a person’s otherness, using a 
relational view of person to that end. We derive this view from Michael 
Bakhtin (1895-1975). 
 According to Bakhtin people do not exist apart from other people: being is 
always co-being (Holquist, 1997, p. 25). One way or another every person is 
related to one (or several) other person(s). Th e dialogical character of this rela-
tion means that in front of the self is not a ‘voiceless thing’, but another self 
with his/her own voice (Todorov, 1995, p. 18). Th e fact that life is always a life 
with others not only refers to the relation between me and the other, I can also 
be an other to myself. Concepts such as ‘being’, ‘self ’, ‘I’ or ‘other’ often used 
in literature to indicate a person’s identity, are no absolute or isolated concepts 
according to Bakhtin, but relative or dialogical concepts (Voloshinov, in: Mor-
ris, 1994, p. 45). So there is not just a (dialogical) relation between individu-
als; an individual also has a (dialogical) relation with himself/herself. 
 Hubert Hermans (1993, 2002) describes the way in which we can picture 
this relation by using the metaphor that a person can take several, even oppo-
site, positions in relation to a situation, event, or even another person. For 
instance, I can admire someone for his courage, yet at the same time condemn 
his actions which have evoked in me this feeling of admiration. Th ese posi-
tions often behave as each other’s opponents. As position and counter position 
these terms express a spatial structure which is characterized by a certain ten-
sion. Th is ﬁeld of tension can take various forms, for instance the form of 
a contrast, or of a collision, and even the form of an agreement. When I 
attribute a diﬀerent appreciation to diﬀerent positions, I can relate to these 
positions in a particular way. Within this framework Hermans also uses the 
term I-positions. I can get I-positions into conversation with each other. In 
this conversation the I-positions have the chance to let their own voice be 
heard and to tell their own story. Th e dialogical relations that are created 
between positions this way can take various forms, for instance the form of a 
construction of questions and answers, a debate, a meeting or a negotiation. 
 In Hermans’ theory the dialogical self is a many-voiced self. Th e voices of 
the diﬀerent positions not only belong to me, but also to others. Th ese others 
can be people who are part of my current environment, but they can also be 
people from my past or even future people. I can hear the voice of my dead 
father or mother in me, or a former teacher or my present partner. I can also 
anticipate future conversations, for example when I am on my way to a job 
interview, or when I am about to have a ‘bad news’ talk with a pupil I have 
supervised. Within myself the positions of, for instance, my father (other) and 
my partner (other) can start a dialogue with one another. It is also possible, 
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though, that the position of one other starts a dialogue with one of my own 
positions. I can then use the result of the dialogue that has taken place inside 
of me, in the communication between me and others. 
 According to the theory of the dialogical self the other is not just outside 
myself, but is also part of me. Th e other is not someone who is ﬁrst deﬁned as an 
individual person and subsequently starts a relation with me. Th e other, as an I-
position, is an intrinsic part of me, as I hold one or several I-positions in the other 
in an intrinsic way. As I-position the other cannot be dissolved from the self. 
 Summing up we argue that the term otherness refers to the I-positions of a 
person. I-position is a relational term indicating that the I (I) relates to the self 
(me). In this relation the other, the ‘not-I-in-me’ can also assume an I-position 
in the (virtual) space of my mind (Holquist, 1997, p. 29). 
 3. Otherness in Dialogical Communication 
 In this paragraph we further examine the signiﬁcance of otherness in dialogical 
communication. Otherness can be expressed in dialogical communication. 
We distinguish between expressing the personal otherness of the speaker and 
the expression of the otherness of the other. We use the term dialogical com-
munication to indicate that the expression of otherness, be it one’s personal 
otherness or that of the other, always happens in relation to the other, which 
can be someone outside myself or the other within myself. Th e concept ‘dia-
logical communication’ can therefore relate both to the communication which 
an individual has with himself/herself and to the communication which a 
person has with other people. We have not investigated the ﬁrst form of dia-
logical communication. In this article we restrict ourselves to the dialogical 
communication between people. 
 In paragraph two we said that every person is related to other people. Th is 
being related means that the other is not just outside myself, but is also intrin-
sically connected with me. Based on this dialogical principle, every expression 
of otherness by a person is related in a similar intrinsic way to the expression 
of otherness by another person. Every expression of otherness is a reaction to 
an earlier expression of otherness. As a result, every expression of otherness is 
conditioned by its preceding expression of otherness and in turn the preceding 
expression of otherness is qualiﬁed by the current expression. Together current 
and preceding expression determine the nature and structure of the commu-
nication (Voloshinov, 1973). Th e type of communication that arises when a 
person (as dialogical self ) expresses otherness in relation to the expression 
of otherness by another person (as dialogical self ), we refer to as dialogical 
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communication. In dialogical communication one always addresses someone 
else, who does not assume a purely passive role in the communication (Bakhtin, 
1986). Th e other, as interlocutor, participates in the expression of otherness. 
In dialogical communication the other and I not only adopt the role of speaker 
in turn; a speaker always reacts to the former speaker and at the same time 
anticipates the reaction to come. So the expression of otherness is not just a 
matter for the speaker alone, but the result of the interaction between speaker 
and other. 
 From the speaker’s point of view, the expression of otherness exists in two 
possible relations: as an expression of the speaker’s own otherness, for instance: 
“I think Christmas is a merry feast”, and as an expression of the otherness of 
the other, for instance: “So you think Christmas is a merry feast”. In the ﬁrst 
example the speaker says something about the way in which the speaker him-
self experiences Christmas. In the second example the speaker says something 
about the way in which the other experiences Christmas. In dialogical com-
munication there are two moments when, analogous to this, the speaker is 
confronted with the otherness of the other: 1) when the other expresses his 
own otherness, and 2) when a speaker expresses the otherness of the other. 
 Th e second case raises the question how much room the speaker’s expres-
sion of the other, oﬀers the other’s otherness. A speaker oﬀers a lot of room to 
the other’s otherness when the speaker tries to express the other’s otherness as 
the other sees it. Contrary to this, a speaker oﬀers little room to the other’s 
otherness when the speaker expresses the other’s otherness as the speaker sees 
it. In the ﬁrst instance there is a possibility to get to know the other; in the 
second instance there is a fair chance that the other will be misunderstood or 
not be understood at all. 
 Otherness is an important aspect of dialogical communication. Indeed, 
without otherness dialogical communication would not be possible. According 
to Bakhtin it is always a case of otherness. Because of the fact that the other is 
an other to me and that I am an other to the other, it is impossible to com-
pletely lose myself in the other and it is impossible for the other to completely 
lose himself in me. To clarify this view, Bakhtin uses ‘the law of placement’ 
(Holquist, 1997, p. 21). Th is law says that all observations occur from a deﬁned 
unique position. Based on this law, I and the other can never make the same 
observation, even though we share the same room at the same time. In other 
words, even though I and the other are in the same (communicative) situation, 
I will still experience this situation diﬀerently from the other. My otherness and 
the other’s otherness can never be reduced to nil. In dialogical communication, 
however, there can be more or less room for otherness. Th e amount of room 
depends on the degree in which a speaker expresses his/her own otherness and 
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the degree in which a speaker expresses the other’s otherness as the other sees it. 
Obviously, it is also possible for a speaker to decide not to pursue the other’s 
otherness. In that case the dialogical communication ceases to exist. 
 Summing up, we argue that dialogical communication exists in a speaker’s 
expression of otherness in relation to the expression of otherness by an other. 
In dialogical communication between people, a speaker can express both his 
own otherness and the other’s otherness. Th e degree in which a speaker 
expresses his own otherness as an expression of the perspective of himself and 
the degree in which the speaker expresses the other’s otherness as an expression 
of the perspective of the other, there is room for otherness in dialogical com-
munication. 
 4. Otherness in Interreligious Dialogical Communication 
 In this paragraph we further explore the meaning of otherness in interreligious 
dialogical communication. Previously, we argued that otherness is an impor-
tant aspect of dialogical communication. In interreligious communication this 
otherness implies the relation of the religious other to a transcendental reality 
(God). God is Other-than-human, or, Totally Other. Religious people deﬁne 
themselves as being related to this Totally Other. Th rough diﬀerent practices 
(such as the reading of holy scriptures, rituals, prayer, virtuous behaviour) they 
want to grow in their relationship toward God, and become a better, spiritu-
ally richer person (Ward, 2004). In order to avoid misunderstanding, we do 
not assume that God is mediated in or via interreligious communication. Reli-
gious people communicate (to a certain degree) about their relationship to 
God. Th is is precisely why the expression of otherness is highly relevant in 
interreligious communication from a theological point of view. 
 Th e question we want to answer in this paragraph, is whether someone can 
learn from the otherness of a religious other because of his or her relationship 
to God? Do we see this relationship distinct from the God to whom we are 
related in our tradition? Do we accept the fact that the religious other is related 
to God as Ultimate Reality? Or do we deny the truth of this relationship? Th e 
answer to this question has a strong impact on the way we respect the other-
ness of religious others in interreligious communication. How do we deal with 
religious pluralism? Th is paragraph describes three diﬀerent views on religion 
based on their openness to religious pluralism: a canonical, a critical (liberal) 
and a global (pluralistic) view on religion (Ward, 2004). Within the latter 
we distinguish two subtypes: mutuality pluralism and acceptance pluralism 
(Knitter, 2002). 
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 A canonical view on religion posits one reality of supreme value (God) in 
which human individuals may ﬁnd proper fulﬁlment. Th is supreme value or 
reality is expressed in sacred texts that have absolute and ﬁnal authority and 
distinguish the orthodox from the heretics. A canonical view on religion leads 
to orthodoxy, which is characterized by a systematic worldview and a consist-
ent and codiﬁed set of moral principles. Religious traditions that hold such a 
view, ‘ﬁnd themselves competing for universal acceptance by all people as a 
revealed, ﬁnal and absolute truth’ (Ward, 2004, p. 221). Within this view on 
religion there is no room for religious pluralism. 
 A critical view on religion moves beyond the understanding of orthodoxy as 
an unchangeable norm for all beliefs and practices. It presses the question of 
the historical authenticity of religious traditions, the epistemological basis for 
their truth claims and their contribution to human fulﬁlment. From a critical 
view on religion, God is not seen as a supreme, sovereign divine will, working 
through church hierarchy (as in a canonical view on religion), but as a loving 
creator, encouraging the social participation of all people. Although a critical 
view on religion is associated with scientiﬁc knowledge and critical enquiry, it 
does not want to dissociate religion from factual belief, but from an authori-
tarian set of beliefs and their institutions (Ward, 2004). As a consequence, a 
critical view on religion permits a degree of pluralism within religions. 
 A global or pluralistic view on religion perceives all religions as parts of one 
global phenomenon of human religiosity. All human cultures have something 
to add to this global phenomenon of religiosity and what they say must be 
heard (Ward, 2004). Within this global view on religion we make a distinction 
between two diﬀerent ways of adding to this global phenomenon of religiosity. 
Th e ﬁrst way is the way of the Mutuality Model, the second way is the way of 
the Acceptance Model. We derive these two models from Paul Knitter (2002). 
As these models oﬀer room for pluralism between diﬀerent religions, which is 
important for the expression of the otherness of diﬀerent religions in interreli-
gious communication, we will explore these models a little more. 
 According to the Mutuality Model, no religion is the only source of God’s 
salvation and the ﬁnal word on what God intends for the world and for 
humanity. In a context of globalisation, the claim that God is fully and 
deﬁnitely revealed in only one religion, no longer stands. Th e adherents of this 
model believe that there is one God, or Ultimate Reality, that can be experi-
enced in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent religions. Each and every religion oﬀers a 
diﬀerent way to experience the ‘one-and-only’. ‘As the meaning of any word 
can be really understood only in a sentence — that is, in relation to other 
words — so the Word of God (. . .) can be understood only within all the sen-
tences that make up the story of God’s dealings with humanity’ (Knitter, 2002, 
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p. 156). Th e critics of this model point to the fact that the model’s concern to 
promote mutuality often leads to neglect, or even violate, diversity (Knitter, 
2002). Firstly, they argue, there is always the possibility that there might be no 
common ground for diﬀerent religions. And even when there is one, we can-
not escape our historical situatedness. Every attempt to locate a universal cen-
tre of all religions, is an attempt from a particular place in history. In speaking 
universally for everyone, mutuality pluralists end up speaking individually for 
themselves (Knitter, 1995). Secondly, setting up a ﬁeld of dialogue from a 
particular perspective, like that of ‘modernity’, is equally imperialistic. It 
imposes particular rules on how to communicate or about what does not have 
to be shared by all religions. 
 Th e Acceptance Model holds a cultural-linguistic view on religion. A 
cultural-linguistic view states that we ﬁrst have to have external ‘words’ given 
to us by our culture before we can have internal words in our minds and in our 
hearts (Knitter, 2002, p. 180). Th e religious words we receive from our culture 
make and shape our religious identity. Th ey are not only a means to express 
our religious identity; our religious identity is also determined by the words 
that are given to us. From this perspective it follows that diﬀerent religions 
are incommensurable. It is impossible to understand one religion or one 
religious word or language by translating it into another religion or into 
another religious word or language. Religious words are true and understand-
able only within the given language system of a particular religion. Moreover, 
every religion oﬀers a totally comprehensive framework in which everything 
ﬁts: the world, itself and the source of it all. But this framework cannot be ﬁt 
into another framework. Th is means that, when every religion oﬀers a perspec-
tive that embraces everything and cannot be embraced by another, ‘more 
embracing’ perspective, no religion can be explained by another religion. Th e 
critics of this model point to the risks of isolation, relativism and ﬁdeism. If 
one insists on incommensurability, then every religious person is conﬁned to 
his or her own religion (isolation). If the truth of each religion only makes 
sense within the language system of each religion, then, on the one hand, each 
religion is protected from the criticisms of others (relativism) and, on the other 
hand, the truth of each religion can only be explained to the adherents of that 
particular religion in the words of that same religion (ﬁdeism). 
 According to the Acceptance Model we have to accept the fact that religions 
are really diﬀerent; religious otherness exists. Th e Mutuality Model wants to 
get beyond religious otherness. Th e Acceptance Model wants to live with reli-
gious otherness for ever. For the Mutuality Model the similarities that can be 
found in diﬀerent religions are more important than the diﬀerences between 
religions. For the Acceptance Model religious diﬀerences are more important 
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than religious similarities. Th e Mutuality Model starts with diversity, in order 
to bring it to unity. For the Acceptance Model the otherness of other religions 
contains a divine surplus that is always more than we can ever know. ‘[It is] in 
the ﬁnite other that the Transcendent Otherness of God keeps entering our 
lives (. . .)’ (Knitter, 2002, p. 221). 
 How does a pluralistic view on religion relate to Christian tradition? As glo-
balisation is inevitable, Christian pluralist theologians, like Hick, Knitter, Pieris 
and Pannikar, (Hick & Knitter, 1989) have argued that it is time for Christian-
ity to adequately respond to its challenges, for three reasons: 1) our growing 
awareness of the historical and cultural limitation of all knowledge and reli-
gious beliefs has lead to the idea that it is impossible to judge the truth-claims 
of other religions on the basis of one’s own, 2) our growing awareness of the 
inﬁnity and the mystery of God, which goes beyond all forms of religious expe-
rience, exceeding every attempt to grasp it, forbids any one religion from hav-
ing the only and ﬁnal word, and 3) there are, throughout the world, so many 
people, in so many diﬀerent cultures, with so many diﬀerent religions, who are 
economically, politically and socially marginalised, that oﬀering a solution to 
these problems can no longer be expected from one single religion. A preferen-
tial option for the poor and the oppressed constitutes the necessity of a dialogue 
with other religions. Th e Catholic Church council seems to be in full agree-
ment with this. In oﬃcial church statements of Vaticanum II, especially the 
‘Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions’, 
the council aﬃrms the universality of grace and salvation and states that even 
atheists, who follow their conscience, can partake in eternal life (Lumen Gen-
tium, 16). But other passages as well, we believe, do support a Christian plural-
istic view on religion, for instance the passage where the world religions are 
praised for the way they have answered ‘those profound mysteries of the human 
condition’. Or when the council recognizes that the beliefs and practices of 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam contain what is ‘true and holy’ and ‘reﬂect a 
ray of that Truth which enlightens all men’. Moreover, the council ‘exhorts’ 
Christians ‘(. . .) through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other 
religions, and in witness of Christian faith and life’, to ‘acknowledge, preserve, 
and promote the spiritual and moral goods found among these [followers of 
other religions]’ (Nostra Aetate, 2. Translation: W. Abbott, 1966). 
 5. Description of the Research 
 Th is paragraph describes the research questions (5.1), the research design and 
sample (5.2) and the measure (5.3), in that order. 
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 5.1 Research Questions 
 Education is the context in which we have investigated the expression of the 
otherness of pupils from diﬀerent religions on the level of the personal appro-
priation of religion. Th is context is dominated by forces that wish to impose 
limitations to otherness in order to guarantee a maximum of comprehension 
(Schön, 1983). Th is raises the question to what extent teachers oﬀer room to 
otherness. Oﬀering room to otherness in an educational context means that 
pupils (once the teacher has invited them to do so) express their own otherness 
as an utterance of their own perspective and that teachers express the otherness 
of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils (section 3). We can 
distinguish between the expression of the otherness of pupils preceding the 
utterances which the pupils use to express their own otherness and following 
these statements. We base this distinction on the proposition that every expres-
sion of otherness is a reaction to an earlier expression of otherness by another 
speaker (section 3). In a religiously pluriform learning situation pupils who 
belong to diﬀerent religions express their own religious otherness as an utter-
ance of the perspective of the religion they belong to and teachers express the 
religious otherness of pupils who belong to diﬀerent religions from the per-
spective of these separate religions. Th e problem that arises in this situation is 
that many teachers have a certain ignorance of religion. A teacher who is unfa-
miliar with religion, will experience far more diﬃculty with discussing the 
otherness of pupils from diﬀerent religions at the level of the personal appro-
priation than at the level of the public meanings (section 1). In the latter case 
a teacher can always fall back on the culturally well-deﬁned meanings of a 
religious tradition. Discussing the religious otherness of pupils from diﬀerent 
religions at the level of the personal appropriation assumes a view on religion 
that leaves room for the diﬀerences between religions. Do teachers hold such 
a view on religion? 
 Based on the above we formulate three research questions: 
1.  To what degree do pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of their 
own perspective in interreligious communication? 
 2.  To what degree do teachers express the otherness of pupils as an utterance of 
the perspective of the pupils, both preceding and following the utterances with 
which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective 
in interreligious communication? 
 3.  Which views on the relations between religions do teachers use in interreligious 
communication? 
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 5.2 Research Design and Sample 
 Th e type of research we have conducted to answer these questions, can be 
described as an explorative and descriptive case study. All in all this case study 
consists of nine cases. Each case is about interaction between a teacher and 
his/her pupils. Th e teachers were selected on their experience with lessons in 
interreligious communication. We preferred classes where interreligious learn-
ing was common practice, because such an environment made it most likely 
that pupils had the opportunity to express themselves. Th e teachers had to be 
prepared (intentionally) to encourage interreligious learning of pupils by 
means of communication. Th e teachers were free in setting the teaching sub-
ject and the teaching structure, but the teaching subject had to be related to at 
least one other religion besides the teacher’s religion. Th e pupils that partici-
pated in these lessons varied in age and were 10-12 years old. Based on the 
school data they had the following religious backgrounds: Catholic (57 %), 
Islamic (33 %), Hinduistic (2 %). Th e other pupils (8 %) were not religious. 
 Prior to each lesson we asked the teachers about their intentions with the 
lesson and about the reasons for the teaching structure and teaching contents. 
Next we videotaped each lesson. At the end of each lesson the teachers watched 
the video recording of their own lesson, indicating what was ‘running through 
their mind’ during the lesson. Th en the teachers evaluated their own lesson 
based on their intentions with the lesson. Th e material of the video recordings 
(the communication between teachers and pupils) was written out and divided 
in teachers’ utterances and pupils’ utterances. Th ree diﬀerent people (encod-
ers) each ﬁtted all utterances with a code, which were then categorised on the 
basis of this coding. Th en all utterances were analyzed by means of SPSS. Th e 
interviews that had been taped were also written out and analyzed. We looked 
at what the teachers said in these interviews about the relations between reli-
gions and religious pluralism respectively. 
 5.3 Measure 
 Th is paragraph has been divided in three subparagraphs. In section 5.3.1 we 
introduce the measuring instrument that we have used to describe the expres-
sion of otherness (Taxonomy or Verbal Response Modes). In section 5.3.2 we 
describe the categories of utterances that are suitable for the expression of the 
personal otherness of the speaker as an utterance of the personal perspective of 
the speaker. In section 5.3.3 we describe the categories of utterances that are 
suitable for the expression of the otherness of the other as an utterance of the 
perspective of the other. 
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 5.3.1 Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes 
 Stiles (1992) developed the Taxonomy or Verbal Response Modes. We have 
chosen this instrument, because it is based on a relational approach to com-
munication: it can be used to describe interactions between people as con-
veyed in language (p. 17). 
 Stiles distinguishes eight diﬀerent manifestations of verbal interaction by 
distinguishing three principles: source of otherness, presumption about other-
ness and frame of reference. Every principle can either take the value ‘speaker’ 
or ‘other’. Every utterance can be considered to concern either the speaker’s 
or the other’s otherness. Moreover, in making an utterance, the speaker may or 
may not make presumptions about the other’s otherness. An utterance may 
or may not require that the speaker presumes to know what the other person 
thinks, feels, perceives or intends. Finally, in making an utterance, the speaker 
may represent the otherness either from his or her own personal viewpoint 
(speaker’s frame of reference), or from a viewpoint that is shared or held in 
common with the other (other’s frame of reference). 
 By combining these three principles, eight (2×2×2) diﬀerent categories of 
utterances are created; disclosures, ediﬁcations, advisements, conﬁrmations, 
questions, acknowledgements, evaluations1 and reﬂections. A disclosure is 
used to express the personal thoughts, feelings, wishes or intentions of the 
speaker, for instance: “I think that when you believe in God, you have to go 
the whole way of faith”. An ediﬁcation expresses the view of the speaker in the 
form of an actual statement, for example: “We do not celebrate Christmas at 
home”. Someone who wants to give advice will indicate what the other should 
think or do according to him/her, for example: “Try and help Carli by explain-
ing why you think Easter is important”. Someone who expresses a conﬁrmation, 
tries to compare his/her own otherness with the otherness of the other, for 
instance: “We believe the same thing, don’t we?”. Someone who asks a ques-
tion, does so because he/she does not have the information he/she would like 
to have, for instance: “Would you also like to take part in the Ramadan?”. By 
expressing an acknowledgement someone wants to show that he/she is recep-
tive to the expression of otherness by the other, in which context one can think 
of ‘meaningless’ sounds, such as ehm, hmm etc. By expressing an evaluation 
someone imposes his/her evaluation on the other, for: “So you do believe in 
God!”. Someone communicating in the form of a reﬂection tries to describe 
the otherness of the other as seen by the other. Th is is easily done by (almost) 
1  Stiles uses the term interpretation for this category of utterances. In view of the cultural-
theoretical approach of this article, this name could be confusing. 
14 S. van Eersel et al. / Journal of Empirical Th eology 21 (2008) 1-31
literally repeating what the other has said, or by rephrasing the otherness of the 
other, for instance: “During the Ramadan it is important to you to think of 
people who have little to eat.” Figure 1 oﬀers a schematic overview of all cat-
egories and shows the way in which the three principles have been combined 
for each category. 
 In applying the instrument, each utterance is coded twice, once with respect 
to its grammatical form and once with respect to its communicative intent.2 
Grammatical form refers to the literal meaning of an utterance; communica-
tive intent refers to the pragmatic meaning. Th e literal meaning of an utter-
ance is based on the dictionary meaning of the words and on the standard 
meaning of the grammatical construction of the words. Th e pragmatic mean-
ing of an utterance is what the speaker intends the utterance to mean on the 
occasion it is used. It refers to on-record meanings only, not to oﬀ-record 
meanings. In contrast to oﬀ-record meanings, on-record meanings are com-
municatively accessible meanings, at least for the other as an interlocutor. Th e 
utterance: “On 25 December we always go to church”, is, for instance, coded 
as a disclosure form in combination with an ediﬁcation intent (DE). Th e 
utterance has a disclosure form, because the words and sentence structure 
indicate that it is an utterance which says something about the speaker him-
self/herself; the speaker uses the ﬁrst person plural. Th e utterance is coded as 
an ediﬁcation intent, because the words and the sentence structure indicate 
that the speaker expresses an utterance which can be falsiﬁed by the other; the 
speaker’s utterance is either right or wrong. If the speaker has an intention in 
mind other than making an actual statement, which remains hidden from the 
other (oﬀ-record meaning), it cannot be coded by means of the Taxonomy of 
Verbal Response Modes. Whenever we apply a disclosure or an ediﬁcation 
code in this article, we refer to the communicative intent of the utterance. We 
do not refer to the grammatical form in which this utterance is presented. Th e 
example above is therefore an example of an ediﬁcation. When we want to 
draw the reader’s attention to the grammatical form of an utterance, we will 
explicitly refer to it. 
 5.3.2 Expressing the Otherness of the Speaker 
 Which categories are best suited for expressing the personal otherness of the 
speaker as an utterance of the perspective of the speaker? When answering this 
question we use both the principles of the instrument and the distinction we have 
made between grammatical form and communicative intent (section 5.3.1). 
2  Th e same categories are used for the form-mode as for the intent-mode. A disclosure-intent 
can for instance be phrased in the grammatical form of a disclosure, yet also in the grammatical 
form of an ediﬁcation, an advisement, a conﬁrmation etc. 
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 Based on the three principles of the instrument, a disclosure is best suited for 
expressing the personal otherness of the speaker as an utterance of the perspec-
tive of the speaker, because the speaker expresses his/her personal otherness 
when uttering a disclosure, and at the same time expresses a presumption 
regarding this otherness and expresses this otherness by means of his/her own 
frame of reference. A second category of utterances of the personal otherness 
of a speaker from the perspective of the speaker is the category of the ediﬁcations. 
Someone who uses an ediﬁcation, expresses, as is the case with a disclosure, 
his/her own otherness in combination with a presumption regarding the per-
sonal otherness. In contrast to the utterance of a disclosure, however, an 
ediﬁcation is expressed by means of the collective frame of reference of a group 
of people. By uttering an ediﬁcation, the speaker expresses an otherness which 
is shared by many people and is therefore considered to be ‘right’ or ‘true’. Th is 






 Frame of 
Reference 
 Category  Code 
 Speaker  Speaker  Speaker  Disclosure (reveals speaker’s 
otherness) 
 D 
 Speaker  Speaker  Other  Ediﬁcation (states collective 
otherness as fact) 
 E 
 Speaker  Other  Speaker  Advisement (guides other’s 
otherness) 
 A 
 Speaker  Other  Other  Conﬁrmation (compares 
speaker’s and other’s 
otherness) 
 C 
 Other  Speaker  Speaker  Question (requests 
information about other’s 
otherness) 
 Q 
 Other  Speaker  Other  Acknowledgement (conveys 
receptiveness to other’s 
otherness) 
 K 
 Other  Other  Speaker  Evaluation (explains or 
labels other’s otherness) 
 I 
 Other  Other  Other  Reﬂection (rewords other’s 
otherness) 
 R 
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is the case when a culturally well-deﬁned meaning of a religious tradition is 
expressed, for instance: “Islam has ﬁve pillars”. It is not clear to what extent 
this expression of otherness is an expression of the speaker’s otherness from the 
personal perspective of the speaker. To obtain more clarity about this, we use 
the distinction which the Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes oﬀer between 
communicative intent and grammatical form. 
 When formulating a disclosure or an ediﬁcation in the grammatical form of 
a disclosure (ﬁrst person singular or plural), the speaker clearly indicates that 
he/she expresses his/her otherness as an utterance of the perspective of himself/
herself. Examples of this are: “I think it is important that you say to God: 
‘thank you for what you have given me’” (DD), or: “On 25 December I always 
go to church” (DE). When a speaker expresses a disclosure or an ediﬁcation 
in the grammatical form of an ediﬁcation (third person singular or plural or 
‘one-form’), it is less clear to what degree the speaker expresses his otherness 
as an utterance of his own perspective. When a pupil is asked why he thinks 
Christmas is a merry feast, and the pupil answers with a disclosure in the form 
of an ediﬁcation, such as “Th en you [one] got to wear your new shoes” (ED), 
it is impossible to tell by the form of the utterance (‘you’) that the pupil 
expresses his own otherness from his own perspective, but it is possible, based 
on the communicative intent of the utterance (to reveal the speaker’s other-
ness) to establish that it is an expression of the personal otherness of the pupil. 
An ediﬁcation, on the other hand, formulated in the grammatical form of an 
ediﬁcation, such as: “On 25 December Christians celebrate [one celebrates] 
Christmas” (EE), cannot be recognized as an expression of the personal other-
ness of the speaker from the perspective of the speaker. An ediﬁcation expresses 
the meaning of a group of people, without a clear indication what the relation 
is between the speaker and this group of people. In our research we therefore 
restrict ourselves to ediﬁcations that have been phrased in the disclosure (I/we) 
form (DE). With regard to the disclosures we focus on both the disclosures 
that have been phrased in the disclosure (I/we) form (DD) and on the disclo-
sures that have been phrased in the ediﬁcation (one) form (DE).3 
 Summarizing we distinguish three categories of utterances that are suitable for 
pupils to express their own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective: 
utterances with a disclosure form and a disclosure intent (DD), utterances 
with an ediﬁcation form and a disclosure intent (ED), and utterances with a 
disclosure form and an ediﬁcation intent (DE). 
3  In practice pupils also use, besides these two manifestations of a disclosure, a disclosure in the 
grammatical form of an acknowledgement (KD). Th is code is only applied when a pupil reacts to 
the teacher with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In view of the question in this article, we leave this category aside. 
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 5.3.3 Expressing the Otherness of the Other 
 Which categories of utterances are suitable for expressing the otherness of the 
other as an utterance of the perspective of the other? When answering this 
question we allow the principles of the Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes 
(section 5.3.1) to guide us once again. Th is time it is not about the expression 
of a pupil himself/herself, but about the intention to undertake verbal interac-
tion as part of the teachers’ responsibility. Consequently, we restrict ourselves 
to the communicative intent of utterances. 
 We distinguish three categories of utterances which, each in their own way 
and to a varying degree, are suitable for the expression of the otherness of the 
other as an utterance of the perspective of the other: reﬂections, acknowledge-
ments and questions. 
 Reﬂections are utterances which are most suitable for expressing the other-
ness of the other as an utterance of the perspective of the other. Th e reason for 
this is that a speaker who uses a reﬂection, expresses the otherness of the other 
using the frame of reference of the other and at the same time expresses a pre-
sumption regarding that otherness. By presumption we mean that the speaker 
presumes to have some knowledge about the otherness of the other. Without 
this presumption it is not possible to reﬂect upon the otherness of the other. 
Nevertheless, it is up to the other to decide if the presumption of the speaker 
is or is not correct! Th e category of the reﬂections has three manifestations: 
repetitions, rewordings and explorations. An utterance is coded as a repetition, 
when it is an (almost) literal repetition of what the pupil has said. Rewordings 
are utterances that make an attempt to rephrase the utterance of a pupil. 
Explorations are rewordings in the form of a question. Since rewordings and 
explorations rephrase the otherness of the other, instead of simply repeating it, 
rewordings and explorations are more suitable for expressing the otherness of 
the other as an utterance of the perspective of the other, than repetitions. 
 Acknowledgements are, like reﬂections, expressions of the otherness of the 
other by means of the frame of reference of the other. Contrary to uttering a 
reﬂection, the speaker expresses by means of an acknowledgement no pre-
sumption regarding the otherness of the other; the speaker does not pretend to 
know the otherness of the other by means of this utterance. An acknowledge-
ment is therefore less suitable for expressing the otherness of the other as an 
utterance of the perspective of the other, than a reﬂection. 
 Finally, Questions, also express the otherness of the other. Unlike, however, 
reﬂections and acknowledgements, a questioner does not express a presump-
tion regarding the otherness of the other, nor does he use the frame of refer-
ence of the other. Is it fair to say that a questioner expresses the otherness of 
the other as an utterance of the perspective of the other? We prefer to turn this 
question around. You cannot say that a questioner does not use the perspective 
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of the other. A speaker who poses a question shows curious involvement in the 
other. He expresses the otherness of the other, though without presuming to 
know the otherness or the perspective of the other. He detects a gap in his 
knowledge about the otherness of the other and hopes to ﬁll this gap with 
knowledge about the other. Th e category of the questions shows minimal 
focus of the speaker on the otherness of the other. We distinguish three 
diﬀerent kinds of questions: real questions, probing questions and test ques-
tions. Real questions and probing questions both inquire after the otherness of 
the other which the speaker does not know or only partly so. Th e diﬀerence 
between real questions and probing questions is that the answer to a real ques-
tion fully meets the intention of the questioner. Th is need not be the case with 
a probing question. When a teacher asks a pupil: “Where do you keep the 
Koran at home?”, and the pupil answers: “On top of the cupboard”, the inten-
tion with which the question was asked, has been fulﬁlled. Th e next real ques-
tion can therefore only relate to a diﬀerent subject, for instance: “When do 
you read the Koran?” or if it is addressed to another pupil: “And where do you 
keep the Koran at home?” By posing a probing question, a questioner indi-
cates that the answer to a previous question has not or just partly met the 
expectations of the questioner. Perhaps the answer to a previous question has 
possibly raised new ‘questions’. When a teacher wants more information than 
the answer to a real question oﬀers, he can ask a probing question. Probing 
questions are questions, such as: “Why do you think that?” or “What do you 
mean by that?”. Contrary to real questions, probing questions try to penetrate 
into the otherness of the other. Test questions have a diﬀerent intention. Test 
questions are actually a didactic trick which teachers use to check if, according 
to them, the pupils possess the right otherness, for instance: “Which other 
feasts do you know?”, or: “What was the sheep feast about again?” Test ques-
tions are an utterance of forces in the educational discourse that wish to impose 
limitations to otherness in order to guarantee a maximum of comprehension 
(see paragraph 5.1), rather than expressions of the otherness of the other. 
 Summarizing we distinguish six categories of utterances that are suitable for 
expressing the otherness of the other as an utterance of the perspective of the 
other: explorations, rewordings, repetitions, acknowledgements, real questions 
and probing questions. 
 6. Results 
 Th e ﬁrst research question reads: to what degree do pupils express their own 
otherness as an utterance of their own perspective in interreligious communi-
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cation? In order to answer this question we have calculated the frequencies of 
the DD, ED and DE categories of utterances which the pupils used during the 
lessons we studied. Before answering our ﬁrst research question, we present a 
few examples of DD, ED and DE utterances made by pupils during the les-
sons. 
 Pupil:  “I do not really have an opinion about the Ramadan”. (DD) 
 Pupil:  “I would like to participate in the Ramadan, (DD) 
but my parents will not allow it”. (DE) 
 Pupil:  “(. . .) that there has been one man in the world who has wanted to sacriﬁce 
himself for the rest of the world”. (ED) 
 Pupil:  “Christmas is not really all that important”. (ED). 
 Table 1 shows the results of the analyses. 
 Table 1: Frequencies of pupils’ DD, ED and DE categories of utterances in % 
Category  % 
 DD Disclosure form & Disclosure intent  9.9 
 ED Ediﬁcation form & Disclosure intent  15.6 
 DE Disclosure form & Ediﬁcation intent  5.5 
 Remaining*  69.0 
 Total (n = 2521)  100.0 
 * Th e remaining category is largely formed by ediﬁcations (50.1 %). 
 Table 1 shows that merely 31 % of all utterances which pupils expressed 
during the nine lessons which we studied in the framework of our question, 
are utterances which show that pupils express their own otherness as an utter-
ance of their own perspective. Th e majority of these utterances (25.5% in 
total) is made up of the category of utterances most suitable to that end: the 
disclosure (DD and ED). Only in a small number of cases (5.5% in total) the 
pupils use an ediﬁcation (DE) instead. Striking in the use of the disclosures is 
that they are more often phrased in the grammatical form of an ediﬁcation or 
one-form (ED), than in the grammatical form of a disclosure or I/we-form 
(DD). Th e one-form is a safer way for expressing one’s personal otherness 
than the I-form. Th e frequent use of the one-form could signify that the pupils 
do not feel suﬃciently safe to express their own otherness. Th is feeling of inse-
curity can be related to the pedagogical climate in class, but it can also mean 
that pupils have a certain unfamiliarity with expressing their own otherness. 
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 Th e second research question reads: to what degree do teachers express the 
otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils, both pre-
ceding and following the utterances with which pupils express their own oth-
erness as an utterance of their own perspective in interreligious communication? 
In order to answer this question we calculated the frequencies of the explora-
tions, rewordings, repetitions, acknowledgements, real questions and probing 
questions which the teachers phrased both immediately preceding and imme-
diately following the DD, ED and DE categories of utterances of the pupils. 
Table two shows the frequencies of teachers’ explorations, rewordings, repeti-
tions, acknowledgements, real questions and probing questions that directly 
precede pupils’ DD, ED and DE categories of utterances. Table three presents 
the frequencies of teachers’ explorations, rewordings, repetitions, acknowl-
edgements, real questions and probing questions that directly follow pupils’ 
DD, ED and DE categories of utterances. 
 Before presenting the results of the analyses in relation to the second research 
question, we ﬁrst present an example from a ﬁeld situation in which the utter-
ances above are used in relation to one another. Th e example is from one of the 
lessons we have analyzed. 
 Teacher: L, what do you do at home during the Sugar feast? (real question) 
 Pupil: I eat a lot. (DE) 
 Teacher: How do you like celebrating the Sugar feast? (real question) 
 Pupil: Fun. (ED) 
 Teacher:  Why? (probing question) 
 Pupil: Because you get to wear your new shoes. (ED) 
 Teacher: B, do you think it is important to celebrate the Sugar feast? (real question) 
 Pupil: Yes, I think it is important. (DD) 
 Teacher:  Why? (probing question) 
 Pupil: First you pray and stuﬀ, (ED) 
 Teacher: Hmm (acknowledgement) 
 Pupil: and then it is just celebrating. (ED) 
 Teacher: Th en it is just celebrating. (repetition) 
 [And a little later, when the conversation is about Christmas . . .] 
 Teacher: J., what does Christmas mean to you? (real question) 
 Pupil: I don’t really celebrate Christmas, (DE) 
 But if Christmas were to go away, I would really mind. (DD) 
 Teacher: Do you mean you would miss something? (exploration) 
 Pupil: I don’t know. (DD) 
 Teacher: L., and to you? (real question) 
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 Pupil:  If you eat something special on that occasion, you can tell that it is not 
standard. (ED) 
 Teacher: So you say you want to turn it into something special. (rewording). 
 How often do teachers use utterances that are suitable for expressing the 
otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils preceding 
utterances with which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of 
their own perspective? 
 Table 2: Frequencies of teachers’ explorations, rewordings, repetitions, 
acknowledgements, real questions and probing questions that directly 









 Exploration  1.0  2.1  2.4 
 Rewording  1.0  2.1  0.0 
 Repetition  3.0  2.1  4.8 
 Acknowledgement  2.0  6.5  2.4 
 Real question  19.8  23.9  35.7 
 Probing question  8.9  13.8  2.4 
 Remaining*  64.3  49.5  52.3 
 Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
 * Th e remaining category is largely formed by advisements. 
 Table 2 ﬁrst shows that less than half the pupils’ expressions of their own oth-
erness as an utterance of their own perspective (DD, ED and DE categories of 
utterances) is preceded by a teacher’s utterance which, based on our theoretical 
framework, is suitable for expressing the otherness of pupils as an utterance of 
the perspective of the pupils (remaining > 49%). 
 Secondly, teachers, preceding pupils’ expressions of their own otherness as an 
utterance of their own perspective, mainly ask many questions and more real 
questions than probing questions. Teachers ask comparatively more real ques-
tions preceding utterances containing an ediﬁcation; probing questions are more 
often used in utterances with a disclosure. It seems that teachers chieﬂy associate 
real questions with ediﬁcations and probing questions with disclosures. Th is 
could mean that teachers are aware of the distinction between disclosures and 
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ediﬁcations as far as the expression of otherness is concerned (see paragraph 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2). Disclosures show more clearly that a speaker expresses his/her 
own otherness than is the case with ediﬁcations, and they are therefore rather 
expressions of an otherness unknown to the other. Due to this unfamiliarity, the 
intention of the questioner to get to know the otherness of the other, cannot just 
be satisﬁed by means of real questions. Real questions do not penetrate suﬃciently 
far into the otherness of the other, as is illustrated by a teacher’s utterance during 
one of the interviews: “I simply continued asking questions [with probing ques-
tions], because I actually wanted to get to the point where we would discuss 
what the Ramadan meant to the girl [pupil] herself”. 
 Finally, we notice that teachers, preceding pupils’ expressions of their own 
otherness as an utterance of their own perspective, hardly use explorations, 
rewordings, repetitions and acknowledgements. Contrary to the categories of 
the real questions and the probing questions, which use the speaker’s frame of 
reference to express the otherness of the other, the categories of the explora-
tions, rewordings, repetitions and acknowledgements use the frame of refer-
ence of the other. Preceding the utterances with which pupils express their 
own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective, the teachers use their 
own frame of reference rather than the pupils’ frame of reference. Th is could 
mean that teachers have diﬃculty with anticipating the otherness of the pupils 
(other). By using their own frame of reference, the teachers safely hold on to 
their own presuppositions. 
 How often do teachers use utterances that are suitable for expressing the other-
ness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils following utter-
ances with which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of their 
own perspective? 
 Table 3: Frequencies of teachers’ explorations, rewordings, repetitions, 
acknowledgements, real questions and probing questions that directly 
follow pupils’ DD, ED and DE categories of utterances in % 















 DD  n=113  4.4  7.1  14.2  16.0  14.2  9.7  34.4  100.0 
 ED  n=200  0.5  19.5  15.5  12.5  11.0  7.0  34.0  100.0 
 DE  n=71  1.4  9.8  8.5  18.3  21.1  1.4  39.5  100.0 
 * Th e remaining category is largely formed by advisements, evaluations and ediﬁcations. 
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 Table 3 ﬁrst shows that over 60% of pupils’ expressions of their own otherness 
as an utterance of their own perspective (DD, ED and DE categories of utter-
ances) is followed by a teacher’s utterance which, based on our theoretical 
framework, is suitable for expressing the otherness of pupils as an utterance of 
the perspective of pupils (34 % ≤ remaining ≤ 39.5 %). When comparing this 
result with those in table 2, it appears that the teachers in their response to 
utterances with which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of 
their own perspective, use more utterances to express the otherness of the 
pupils as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils than preceding these 
pupils’ utterances. 
 Secondly, we can see that teachers following pupils’ expressions of their own 
otherness as an utterance of their own perspective, make more use of acknowl-
edgements, real questions and probing questions than reﬂections (explora-
tions, rewordings, repetitions). Acknowledgements, real questions and probing 
questions are all categories of utterances where the teacher does not express a 
presumption regarding the otherness of pupils, which make these utterances 
less suitable for expressing the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the per-
spective of pupils. As a result, the room which teachers oﬀer for the expression 
of otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils, is reduced. 
 Th irdly, within the category of the reﬂections, which is most suited for 
expressing the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils, 
teachers use more repetitions than rewordings and explorations. Teachers often 
repeat the personal otherness as expressed by pupils literally, rather than try 
and capture this otherness in their own words, and still use the frame of refer-
ence of the pupils, when they return it to the pupils. Th is, too, restricts the 
room which teachers oﬀer for the expression of the otherness of pupils as an 
utterance of the perspective of pupils. Teachers seem to adopt a cautious atti-
tude in relation to the otherness of pupils. 
 Fourthly, teachers make little use of explorative questions (explorations) 
and probing questions. Teachers hardly continue asking questions, whether 
they express (in the case of an exploration) or do not express (in the case of a 
probing question) a presumption regarding the otherness of the pupil. Th is is 
also an indication that teachers are very careful regarding the otherness as 
expressed by pupils. 
 Fifthly, teachers more often use explorative questions and probing questions 
as a response to pupils’ disclosures than as a response to pupils’ ediﬁcations 
and more often as a response to pupils’ disclosures that have been phrased in 
the I/we-form (DD) than as a response to pupils’ disclosures that have been 
phrased in the one-form (ED). Rewordings, on the other hand, are more often 
used as a reaction to pupils’ disclosures that have been phrased in the one-form 
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(ED) than as a reaction to pupils’ disclosures that have been phrased in the I/
we-form (DD). Th is could mean that teachers ‘continuing to ask questions’ 
chieﬂy associate with utterances which in their grammatical form are also a 
clear expression of the personal otherness of the other (see paragraph 5.3.1). 
Utterances that express the personal otherness of a person in the third person 
singular or plural (it, impersonal ‘you’, one), suggest a general statement rather 
than an expression of the personal otherness and are therefore less inviting to 
explore. 
 Finally, it is striking that, like preceding utterances with which pupils 
express their own otherness (see above), real questions are used more often to 
react to pupils’ ediﬁcations than to pupils’ disclosures. Th is is not surprising in 
view of the nature of real questions. 
 Our third research question reads: which views about the relations between 
religions do teachers use in interreligious communication? In order to answer 
this question we have used both the interviews preceding the lesson and the 
ones after the lesson, plus the interviews during which the teachers watched 
the video recording of their lesson. Th ese interviews show that all teachers, 
except for one, hold a view about the relations between religions that seems to 
correspond with that of the Mutuality Model (section 4). During the inter-
view one teacher makes statements that point to the Acceptance Model. Th e 
teachers, who use ‘the Mutuality Model’, agree that there is one Universal 
Reality which is the same for all religions. Statements from teachers that illus-
trate this conclusion are, for instance: “In essence religions hold more com-
mon ground than diﬀerences”, or: “Th ere is far more that connects religions 
than that keeps them apart”. Th is does not always mean that these teachers are 
blind to the diﬀerences, but the diﬀerences between religions are considered 
less important than the similarities. It has to do with the nature of the 
diﬀerences and the nature of the similarities. Th e similarities have to do with 
the experience of an Ultimate Reality, which transcends our everyday reality; 
the diﬀerences between religions are considered to be ‘human interpretations’ 
of this one Ultimate Reality. Within the Mutuality Model these diﬀerences 
between religions are valued diﬀerently. Some teachers are not really interested 
in these human interpretations, as the following statements show: “And 
whether you are Muslim, Hindu or Jew, or whatever, that really does not mat-
ter to me at all”, “I just happen to be a Roman Catholic. (. . .) Had I grown up 
in a Muslim family, I think I would have had the same ideas”, or: “And this 
[the similarity we have found], I think, can (. . .) push away those religious 
outward appearances”. To others these diﬀerences are a source of conﬂict and 
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tension between religions: “Similarities connect, diﬀerences separate”, or a 
sign of weakness: “I also think that you should not need, an outside, other 
people to know what it is you believe in. (. . .) I can understand that people 
want somewhere to go to. (. . .) I think it is quite scary”. Others regard it as an 
enrichment, though from the viewpoint that diﬀerent religions express 
diﬀerently the one thing that connects us all : “I am satisﬁed when they [the 
pupils] know what the Feast of Tabernacles means, that the Feast of Tabernac-
les is a Jewish feast, but that we [non-Jews] also have thoughts that are related 
to the Feast of Tabernacles”, or: “Each faith [religion] has charity, each faith 
[religion] has peace (. . .) and each faith [religion] has: ‘God takes care of His 
children’”. Many teachers indicate that they think that the religion within 
oneself or being able to make one’s own choices about faith and religion, is 
important: “(. . .) and that pupils must learn [the way in which religions 
inﬂuence the lives of people] to make their own choices”, because the real 
faith, which is universal, is in man himself: “(. . .) and that they [the pupils] 
will realize that religion is not something from above, but that it actually 
comes from within as well. And that when I hear the stories of religions being 
opposed to one another (. . .) that that is a wrongful view on religion”. 
 Th e teacher whose views seem to agree most with the Acceptance Model, 
does not mention anything during the interview about the universal charac-
ter of religion, but merely talks about the diﬀerences between religions and 
about the importance to learn from one another. Illustrative is the statement: 
“I think the lesson is a success when the pupils have communicated. So when 
they have talked about this subject [religious feasts]. One pupil reacts, the 
other responds with a reaction, so they have really discussed it. (. . .) what 
such a feast can mean to someone and that another feast again has a com-
pletely diﬀerent meaning for someone else or the same feast has a diﬀerent 
meaning for the ﬁrst one. (. . .) Th at is, I think, important indeed. One person 
experiences something this way and the other experiences it that way and a 
third one has again a totally diﬀerent experience and to start a discussion 
about this, yes, I think that is quite useful to improve perhaps mutual under-
standing”. Contrary to the other teachers who use the Mutuality Model, this 
teacher does not make statements that point in the direction that the 
diﬀerences between the religions have to be overcome. On the contrary, the 
fact that he says that a religious feast can have diﬀerent meanings for indi-
vidual pupils, shows that in his lessons he wants to make room for the expres-
sion of the otherness of pupils from diﬀerent religions at the level of the 
personal appropriation and that there is room in his views for diﬀerences 
between religions. 
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 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
 In paragraph 5.1 we raised three questions: 1) to what degree do pupils express 
their own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective in interreligious 
communication?, 2) to what degree do teachers express the otherness of pupils 
as an utterance of the perspective of the pupils, both preceding and following 
the utterances with which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance 
of their own perspective in interreligious communication? and 3) which 
views about the relation between religions do teachers use in interreligious 
communication? Which conclusions can be drawn with regard to these three 
questions? 
 1) Less than one third of all pupils’ utterances is an expression of the other-
ness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils. Th e majority of 
these expressions of otherness has been expressed by means of the category of 
utterances most suited to that end: the category of the disclosures (see para-
graph 5.2). At the same time, however, we observe that half of these disclo-
sures has not been phrased in the I/we-form, but in the one-form instead. Th is 
is remarkable, as it concerns an expression of the personal thoughts and/or 
feelings of pupils. An explanation for this could be that by expressing them-
selves, pupils make themselves vulnerable and, as it were, surrender to the 
judgement of the other. Th e one-form is a far safer way to express one’s per-
sonal otherness than the I/we-form. Th is signiﬁcance of security can refer to 
the pedagogical climate in class, but it can also refer to the degree of familiarity 
with expressing (religious) otherness. Th e limited extent, in which pupils 
express their own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective in inter-
religious communication, can indicate that the pupils experience a certain 
ignorance of expressing religious otherness. 
 2) Less than half of pupils’ expressions of their own otherness as an utter-
ance of their own perspective, is preceded by a teacher’s utterance which, based 
on our theoretical framework, is suitable for expressing the otherness of pupils 
as an utterance of the perspective of pupils. Th e category of utterances which 
teachers use most to this end, is the category of the questions (real questions 
and probing questions). Th is category, however, is hardly capable of expressing 
the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils. Real ques-
tions and probing questions are used to obtain information about the other’s 
otherness, instead of asking questions about the other’s otherness from within 
this otherness.4 It is noticeable that real questions are asked more often preced-
4  Th e latter takes place by means of explorations (rewordings phrased as a question). 
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ing pupils’ ediﬁcations than preceding pupils’ disclosures, whereas probing 
questions are asked more often preceding pupils’ disclosures than preceding 
pupils’ ediﬁcations. Th is could mean that teachers are conscious of the fact 
that ediﬁcations are less suitable for expressing the personal otherness of pupils 
as an utterance of the perspective of pupils than disclosures. After all, the more 
pupils express their own otherness, the more utterances they make on matters 
which the teachers ﬁnd strange. In that case real questions no longer supply 
suﬃcient information for the teachers to express this otherness (of the pupils) 
in an adequate way. 
 3) Preceding the utterances with which pupils express their own otherness 
as an utterance of their own perspective, teachers use signiﬁcantly more real 
questions and probing questions than acknowledgements, explorations, 
rewordings and repetitions. Contrary to real questions and probing questions, 
which use the frame of reference of the speaker, acknowledgements, explora-
tions, rewordings and repetitions are utterances that use the frame of reference 
of the other. Th is means that teachers, preceding the utterances with which 
pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of their own perspective, 
make more use of their own frame of reference than of the pupils’ frame of 
reference. Th is means that they do not express the otherness of pupils as an 
utterance of the perspective of the pupils, but as an utterance of their own 
perspective. Th is could be explained by the fact that teachers ﬁnd it hard to 
anticipate the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the personal perspective of 
pupils. 
 4) Over 60 % of pupils’ expressions of their own otherness as an utterance 
of their own perspective is followed by a teacher’s utterance which, based on 
our theoretical framework, is suitable for expressing the otherness of pupils as 
an utterance of the perspective of pupils. In their response to utterances with 
which pupils express their own otherness as an utterance of their perspective, 
the teachers use more utterances that are suitable for expressing the otherness 
of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils, than preceding these 
pupils’ utterances. Th is is not surprising. In a response to what pupils have said 
about themselves, teachers will be more inclined to express the personal other-
ness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils than preceding 
pupils’ utterances. Preceding pupils’ utterances, teachers are mainly trying to 
persuade pupils to say something. 
 5) Th e majority of the utterances, however, which teachers use to express 
the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils following 
pupils’ expressions of their own otherness, are those where the teacher does 
not express a presumption regarding the otherness of pupils (acknowledge-
ments, real questions and probing questions). Th is means that the teachers 
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stand aloof from the otherness of pupils. Th is picture is reinforced by the fact 
that when teachers use the category of the reﬂections, which is the category 
most suited for expressing the otherness of the other as an utterance of the 
perspective of the other, they more often use repetitions than rewordings and 
explorations. Repetition is the least suited of these three kinds of reﬂection to 
express the otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils. A 
literal repetition of what the other has said does not clarify, after all, what the 
present speaker does or has done with the otherness expressed by the other. 
Moreover, teachers use the type of reﬂection that oﬀers most room to the oth-
erness of the other, the exploration,5 least of all! During the lessons we have 
studied, teachers use few utterances that are largely suitable for expressing the 
otherness of pupils as an utterance of the perspective of pupils. In other words, 
in interreligious communication, the teachers create limited room only for the 
otherness of the pupils by means of their utterances. 
 6) In the lessons we studied, following pupils’ expressions of their own oth-
erness as an utterance of their own perspective, the teachers more often use an 
explorative question or a probing question in relation to pupils’ disclosures 
than in relation to pupils’ ediﬁcations and more often in relation to pupils’ 
disclosures that have been phrased in the I/we-form (DD) than in relation to 
pupils’ disclosures that have been phrased in the one-form (ED). Rewordings, 
on the other hand, are more often used in relation to pupils’ disclosures that 
have been phrased in the one-form (ED) than in relation to pupils’ disclosures 
that have been phrased in the I/we-form (DD). Th is could mean that teachers 
‘continuing to ask questions’ (by means of explorative questions and probing 
questions) chieﬂy associate with utterances that are undeniably an expression 
of the personal otherness of a person as an utterance of his/her own perspective 
(see paragraph 5.3.1). Utterances that express the personal otherness in the 
third person singular or plural (it, impersonal ‘you’, one) suggest a certain 
distance to the applied frame of reference. Th ey are a ‘hidden’ expression of the 
personal otherness and are thus less inviting to be explored. 
 7) Most teachers hold a view about the relation between religions that starts 
from the existence of one Ultimate Reality for all religions, which can be expe-
rienced by all people, regardless of their religion. Religions are considered to 
be the human interpretations of this Ultimate Reality. As people (and their 
cultures) diﬀer that much, their interpretations of this one Ultimate Reality 
are also diﬀerent. Th ese diﬀerences, however, are overcome by this one Ulti-
5  An exploration is a rewording phrased as a question. It is a combination of the oﬀering-
room-for-otherness qualities of a rewording with the inviting eﬀect of a question. 
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mate Reality. In the communication with pupils who belong to diﬀerent reli-
gions, this view is expressed in a search for similarities between religions at the 
level of the public meanings of religions, rather than in naming the diﬀerences 
between religions at the level of the pupils’ personal appropriation of these 
meanings. Most teachers stress religious ‘sameness’, with reference to the cul-
turally well-deﬁned meanings of religious traditions, rather than religious oth-
erness as the appropriation of religious meanings by individual pupils. 
 Summing up, we come to the conclusion that in the lessons of interreligious 
communication which we studied, religious otherness is being expressed, both 
by pupils and teachers! At the same time we observe a kind of shyness, among 
both pupils and teachers, to bring this otherness up for discussion. Where does 
this shyness come from? A ﬁrst explanation could be that the context in which 
we studied interreligious communication, the context of education, leaves lit-
tle room for otherness. According to Wertsch (1991) education frequently 
uses a theoretical form of knowledge that needs to be reproduced. Education 
is also characterized by a diﬀerence in the division of power between teacher 
and pupils. Th e ultimate aim of this way of communicating is the organization 
of the intermental plane in a way that its patterns can be mastered and inter-
nalized by pupils ‘the right way’. Th e teachers who participated in our research, 
seem to have a hard time with being objective about this ‘monological’ way of 
communication. Th is emerges, for instance, from the fact that, seen from our 
theoretical perspective, they use their own frame of reference too much and 
too little the frame of reference of their pupils. Th e fact that the pupils often 
express their otherness in the third person (one-form) , could also point to an 
educational culture which has not been suﬃciently organized for the openness 
and insecurity involved in the expression of the otherness of pupils from 
diﬀerent religions at the level of the personal appropriation. 
 Leaving room for otherness in dialogical communication means that teach-
ers must focus on the unknown. Not so much unknown, unloved (as the say-
ing goes), but ﬁrst and foremost, insecure. Teachers do not like to part with 
the control of the learning process. Th e teachers also feel a lot of insecurity 
regarding the contents of the learning process (the meanings of the various 
religions): “Do the children know why, why it is the way it is, and do I know 
myself?”. Many teachers have a certain unfamiliarity with religion, not only 
with the religions of the immigrants (Islam, Hinduism), but also increasingly 
with the Christian religion. A teacher who is unfamiliar with religion, will 
have far more diﬃculty with talking about the otherness of pupils from 
diﬀerent religions at the level of the personal appropriation of religions than 
at the level of the public meanings of religions. In the latter case a teacher 
can always fall back on the public meanings of a religious tradition. Even the 
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views of teachers on the relation between religions leave little room for the 
expression of the otherness of diﬀerent religions at the level of the personal 
appropriation. Teachers are more focussed on expressing ‘what it is that con-
nects religions rather than what separates them’. 
 When interreligious communication in an educational setting remains 
restricted to the explanation and the reproduction of the public meanings of 
religions, in other words, when pupils can only use the (collective) positions of 
religious traditions to express themselves instead of using the positions that 
express their personal appropriation of those traditions, they are deprived of 
the possibility to explore and get to know their otherness. What’s more, pupils 
‘learn’ that the other in interreligious communication is only interested in the 
otherness of religious traditions, or rather: how ‘one’ behaves in Islam, Chris-
tianity, etc. Consequently, the ‘dialogical’ (or the encounter with the otherness 
of the other) in interreligious communication is not done justice. 
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